指称的目的是联系语言和现实。指称是句子的“初始概念”，构成语言哲学研究的出发点。本文从罗素、斯特劳森、唐纳伦等人的经典研究出发，提出“指称的社会浮现”观点。从社会浮现的视角看，指称通过句子进入交流语境，既受语境制约，又改变语境性质，反映了社会过程对于指称活动的影响。因此，指称的成立不能单纯依赖于对指称对象的识别，而应纳入言者和听者共享意义的交流框架，从指称的社会意义中寻找根据。从定指和不定指的指称形式可以看出，指称“双闪”于语言和现实，存在“识别”和“理解”两种偏向。只有置身于社会活动，结合交流题旨，指称的意义才能浮现。在此前提下，才能进一步解释指称形式和指称对象不对称的原因，厘清其间存在的特殊性和普遍性的关系，定位出指称的社会使用规律。

Reference serves to connect language with reality and constitutes one of the primary notions in the study of sentence meaning and philosophy of language. Drawing on classical discussions by Russell, Strawson, Donnellan and others, this article proposes the perspective of the “social emergence of reference”. From this perspective, reference enters communicative contexts through sentences; it is shaped by context while also reshaping the nature of context. Thus, reference cannot be grounded solely in the identification of referential objects, but must be understood within a communicative framework in which speaker and hearer construct shared meaning. The article argues that definite and indefinite forms of reference reveal a dual orientation between language and reality: identification and interpretation. Definite reference tends to foreground the identification of objects in reality, whereas indefinite reference often foregrounds the interpretation of sentence meaning and the transmission of knowledge. Only in social activity, and in relation to the communicative purpose of an utterance, can referential meaning emerge. On this basis, the article explains the asymmetry between referential forms and referential objects, clarifies the relation between particularity and generality, and outlines the social regularities governing the use of referential expressions.